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“And Yet It Moves”—
The First Amendment and Certainty
by RONALD K.L. COLLINS*

Abstract
Surprisingly few, if any, works on the First Amendment have
explored the relation between free speech and certainty. The same
holds true for decisional law. While this relationship is inherent in
much free speech theory and doctrine, its treatment has nonetheless
been rather opaque. In what follows, the author teases out—
philosophically, textually, and operationally—the significance of that
relationship and what it means for our First Amendment
jurisprudence. In the process, he examines how the First Amendment
operates to counter claims of certainty and likewise how it is employed
to demand a degree of certainty from those who wish to cabin free
speech rights. Drawing its satirical title from words purportedly
spoken by Galileo when he was persecuted by ecclesiastical
inquisitors for defending the heliocentric theory of Copernicus, the
Essay argues that many free speech theories (from Milton to
Meiklejohn and beyond) have the net effect of constricting our First
Amendment freedoms based on uncertain claims to normative benefits
and equally uncertain claims of societal harm. In this general sense,
many free speech theorists might be viewed as the descendants (albeit
kinder ones) of Galileo’s ecclesiastical detractors insofar as they
invoke their own certainty of morals (or normative theories) or alleged
harms to trump actual facts in order to censor speech. This problem
is compounded when First Amendment lawyers must disingenuously
pigeonhole their client’s speech into the doctrinal boxes compatible
with normative theories. In the duplicitous course of things, bawdy
comedy becomes political action, erotic sexual expression becomes
self-realization, offensive speech becomes cultural criticism, and
imagistic commercial expression becomes consumer information.
Strange as it is, in such circumstances falsity is necessarily called into

* Harold S. Shefelman Scholar, University of Washington, School of Law. I happily
acknowledge the thoughtful comments offered by my friend and colleague, David Skover, and
likewise thank Tricia Wolf for her help.

229

06 COLLINS (DO NOT DELETE)

230

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

11/15/2017 1:42 PM

[Vol. 45:2

the service of placing a normative face on aberrant expression. By
way of a bold counter to all such theories, and duly mindful of the role
of real harm in the working scheme of things, the author advances a
view of the First Amendment premised less on certainty (and its
conceptual cousin, normativity) than on risk—real and substantial
risks, properly comprehended. Thus understood, the very idea of risk
deserves to be an accepted and preferred part of the calculus of
decision-making, be it judicial, legislative or executive. Hence, at the
philosophical level, a risk-free First Amendment is a contradiction
while at the operational level it is a formula for suppression.
Undaunted by the specter of criticism of his own experimental views
on the matter, the author invites the kind of First Amendment risktaking once roundly championed by Justice Louis Brandeis—a brand
of freedom though uncertain of its success is nevertheless hopeful of
its attainment.

They command the earth to stand still, less
their possessions be endangered, and their
peasants begin to think new thoughts.
– Bertolt Brecht1
Certainty is the servant of the censor.
That proposition, of course, cannot be canonical without being ironical.
Still, it is close enough to whatever is the mark by which we evaluate ideas.
Think of it: On April 12, 1633, when Galileo Galilei was brought before his
ecclesiastical inquisitors for defending the heliocentric theory of Copernicus,
the grand defenders of the Holy Apostolic Truth were certain of his religious
heresy and his scientific error. The secular science he proffered in his
Dialogue on the Great World Systems (1632)2 did not square with
Ecclesiastical Truth. Hence, he was tried. Later, after he was convicted and
facing the specter of prison,3 the Italian astronomer and philosopher
reluctantly recanted and mouthed the words of a humiliating abjuration to
the General Inquisitors against Heretical Depravity.4 Legend has it that
somewhere along the way Galileo muttered a dissident phrase, “Eppur si

1. FREDERIC EWEN, BERTOLT BRECHT: HIS LIFE, HIS ART, HIS TIMES 335 (1992) (quoting
files from BRECHT ARCHIVES & WERNER MITTENZWEI, BERTOLT BRECHT: VON DER
MASSNAHME ZU LEBEN DES GALILEO).
2. Since Galileo wrote his work in Italian, rather than in the customary scholarly Latin, it
was far more accessible to lay readers of the time and thus more dangerous to the Church. See
BENÉT’S READER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA 381 (4th ed. 1996).
3. See THE TRIAL OF GALILEO 1612-1633, 189–93 (Thomas F. Mayer ed., 2012).
4. Id. at 194.
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muove!” (“And yet it moves”).
Meanwhile, the decree of the
6
Congregation of the Index prevailed whereupon purist certainty returned
to the bloody land.
Galileo did not follow the example of Socrates, who was forced to
swallow the noxious certainty of his Athenian detractors. Facts aside, they,
too, were convinced of the true identity of their gods and the Secret and
Sacred Truths they espoused.7 So it has been for centuries, no matter the
nation, creed, or ideology.
What well-functioning tyrannies and
malfunctioning democracies have in common is some abiding commitment
to certainty of one form or another. At some pinpoint in conceptual time,
the former implodes into the latter, though it may take years to detect and
even longer to concede. But by then it is too late, for certainty has taken its
tragic toll. Oh, the evils that have been and continue to be committed—lives
taken, torture inflicted, liberty deprived, and reputations smeared—in
Certainty’s name.
To say that one is certain is to say that something is beyond doubt; it is
to say, for example, that the question under consideration is settled—it does
not move anymore. “Moral certainty” adds an ethical or spiritual dollop of
finality to the matter; it stills the need for discussion even more. In their
unadulterated forms, monism, purism, absolutism, originalism, textualism,
communism, liberalism, conservatism, atheism, and almost every other kind
of-ism is akin to moral certainty—they are its secular cousins. Where such
isms rule over the minds of men and the wills of women,8 there is little room,
if any, for movement in the opposite direction. Censorship by the
government’s formal decree or a group’s informal directive is the inevitable
result. Of course, the censor—even in the most tyrannical of regimes—
always invokes some justification, “higher good,” or norm to rationalize or
legitimize enforced silence. But whatever the justification, the followers of
the Congregation of the Index demand their way.

5. See ANDREA FROVA & MARIAPIERA MARENZANA, THUS SPOKE GALILEO: THE GREAT
SCIENTIST’S IDEAS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE PRESENT DAY 464 (1998). See also HANS C.
OHANIAN, EINSTEIN’S MISTAKES: THE HUMAN FAILINGS OF GENIUS 37 (2008).
6. This was a decree issued in 1616 by the Sacred Congregation of the Index condemning
the Copernican theory of heliocentricity. See JEROME J. LANGFORD, GALILEO, SCIENCE, AND THE
CHURCH 86–104 (3d ed. 2003).
7. See JOSIAH OBER, SOCRATES AND DEMOCRATIC ATHENS, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO SOCRATES 141–48 (Donald L. Morrison ed., 2011).
8. Simone Weil offered a remarkably insightful discussion of this general point in a
powerful 1937 essay. See SIMONE WEIL, SELECTED ESSAYS, 1934–43 at 154, 156–65 (Richard
Rhees trans., 1962). See GABRIELLA FIORI, SIMONE WEIL: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 149–
54 (Joseph R. Berrigan trans., 1989) (discussing the context in which this famous essay was
penned).
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Aspirationally, the secular “gospel” of the First Amendment, by
contrast, stays the censorial hand in ending discourse. As here understood,
the Madisonian principle operates to move the vagaries of dialogue further
along. In this sense, it is no faithful respecter of Truth with a capital T.
Likewise, it is a foe to the dogmas of certitude preached by the Paters of Ism.
Rather, the free speech frame of mind to which I refer invites Socratic gadfly
types back into the city of dialogue from whence they were driven out. In
other words, it allows the gods of the city to be challenged and the circularity
of the heliocentricity of the sun to be defended. It leaves omniscience to the
gods and everything short of that to mortals with enough will and
determination to push Sisyphean stones.
Seen in this light, the First Amendment both humbles and irritates us.
It begs the nagging question, and then again, almost ad infinitum. In various
ways—political and apolitical, civil and uncivil, scientific and unscientific,
religious and secular—this way of acting disparages Darwin (and his critics),
derides Derrida (and his opponents), and dismisses even the teachings of the
great Dalai Lama (and his detractors). Why? There are many answers, but
let me tender one, if only for preliminary consideration and examination.
Start here: Truth might well be viewed more as a verb than a noun, more
as a process than an end, and more incomplete than complete. Granted,
gravity makes its demands and cancer conquers many a cell. But in the long
run how we as humans come to understand such things is more an evolving
cerebral matter than a static scientific truth. Viewed in categorical terms,
Darwin’s theory of evolution may now in some measure seem uncertain
because it was incomplete; it stopped the truth process before the discovery
of the double-helix structure of DNA.9 We pay a price for certainty.
Moreover, certainty has a way of becoming uncertain over time—the texture
of truth never feels quite the same as one generation after another touches it.
Process (I do not say progress) is not a one-way ratchet. It does not
always wrench towards truth, or improve life for the better, or explain things
satisfactorily, or make the world more just, or more democratic, or more
egalitarian, or coincide with our norms. Process, qua process, is indifferent
to such values. It is no more normative than a hammer. To extend the
metaphor, if in the name of the First Amendment we allow people to use
such tools, we do so more in the blind hope that the resulting product will be
more constructive than destructive. But who can be sure of how such matters

9. See RICHARD WILLIAM NELSON, DARWIN, THEN AND NOW: THE MOST AMAZING
STORY IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 274 (2009) (“The discovery of [the double helix] was
monumental. Now that the actual structure of genetic information had been discovered, the
mysterious events of evolution were open for further molecular investigation.”) See generally,
JAMES SCHWARTZ, IN PURSUIT OF THE GENE: FROM DARWIN TO DNA (2010).
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will play out? By that calculus, this belief in the First Amendment asks us
to trade certainty for contingency, and this with the uncertain expectation
that something good may come of all of this. Those who oppose this
contingent mindset often demand that the rest of us yield to their Truths, that
we abandon our uncertainties in the name of their convictions, and that we
carve out ever more and more exceptions to the First Amendment, if only to
make way for the norms which they are certain are central to any just society
(or, should I say, to their view of such a society).
All too often Truth tumbles with hubris, with that smug audacity so
confident of itself that it stands alone in the corner of the courtyard,
deliberately distanced from the place where real ideas are exchanged. Its
nemesis is a humility born of doubt about one’s own grasp of things, both
epistemological and moral. “We have made enough mistakes along the
way,” Albert Camus once warned, “to be able to benefit from the lessons that
failure always has to teach.”10 How true. The benefits of failure, it should
be noticed, come after the fact, after the proverbial damage has been done.
Take, for example, the Pentagon Papers case,11 in which the government
maintained that national security would be compromised and jeopardized if
the leaks Daniel Elsberg orchestrated and the Washington Post and New York
Times sought to publish were made public.12 As it turned out, the
government’s claim was exaggerated and unfounded.13 Thus, had the Court
ruled other than it did, it would have sided with the “Government’s Truth”
leaving the country to learn “from the lessons that failure has to teach.”
By contrast, the First Amendment as portrayed herein14 moves in the
opposite direction. It prefers humility to hubris,15 dialogue to censorship,
correction to certainty, some uncomfortable chaos to lockstep conformity,
and the free flow of information to brash claims of secrecy, at least when
there is no real, substantial, and imminent harm to be suffered. By that
measure, such a First Amendment mindset is a modest one, a mind open to
the actual possibility that it might be wrong in its claims of Truth, in its

10. ALBERT CAMUS, ALGERIAN CHRONICLES 70 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Alice Kaplan
ed., 2013).
11. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
12. See FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 138–39, 382–83, 392 (2013).
13. Id. at 135–54.
14. When I speak of “the First Amendment” in this way, I do not mean to invoke a Deus ex
Machina argument premised on an abstraction that is personified. Rather, I mean to refer to a
general mindset consistent with the arguments advanced in this Essay.
15. Of course, the First Amendment likewise has its bolder, passionate side, which is one of
its main features. Even there, however, a certain degree of skepticism is warranted. See infra notes
85–88 and accompanying text.
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assessment of the societal worth of a given form of expression, in its
democratic calculation, in its moral evaluation, in its aesthetic judgment, or
simply wrong in its starting premises. Such a view of things, of course, is
not a cure all. It is rather a process that, in the democratic scheme of things,
errs on the side of more expression not less, if only because it aspires to teach
us all a few lessons this side of failure.

As it turned out, Galileo, the old heretic, may have had it right, the
canonical crowd be damned. From that vantage point, the new heretics are
the ones who preach the old dogma of the Congregation of the Index. Of
course, in modern times (at least here in Western world), they are more
inclined to leave some heretics to their contrarian ways and do not subject
them to the rack, wheel, or the garrote. Why? Because their unbelief does
not really challenge societal certainty in any ways that actually offend us, or
that destabilize the world we have come to accept. Their uncertainty is
relatively harmless. Case in point: No one lost much sleep when Pluto was
removed from the celestial maps since it really did not upset the axis around
which our daily lives and belief systems rotate.
So far as the principle of free expression is concerned, the matter of
certainty also cuts in other directions. That is, sometimes expression is
abridged because those who would have the government do so are not
entirely certain of the stability of their own creed or ideology. Nonetheless,
they want their creed (however diplomatically branded or craftily couched)
to prevail. Since their certainty is fragile it is in need of protection, which is
the point at which the idea of censorship sets it. Insecurity, too, beckons the
censorial hand. If you are unsure about the future of American values but
you are certain they must triumph, then censor the expression of those who
contest them—e.g., anarchists, Communists, antiwar protestors,
environmentalists, feminists, Muslim sympathizers, advertisers,
pornographers, for-profit corporations, and all sorts of other ideological and
cultural rogues. By that norm, they need to be kept at bay (for example, in
those ironically tagged campus “free speech zones”). Those uncertain of the
viability of their beloved moral code will banish all expression that
challenges it, as the history of Anthony Comstock (1844-1915) and the
obscenity laws named after him so vividly demonstrate. Comstock’s heirs
will not allow the other world to turn with theirs; theirs is sole sexual truth
of the moral universe. In that universe, many a life and many a liberty
sacrificed to save ears from hearing uncouth words or eyes from seeing the
unholy sight of amorous bodies bonding intimately.
There is a related kind of government uncertainty that arises in the
context of digital information and those governmental and private actors who
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regulate it. There, the specter of uncertainty so troubles the State’s quest
for national security that it feels justified in engaging in questionable
censorial practices, either direct or indirect, to provide it with a greater
degree of purported certitude in matters such as ferreting out terrorists or
identifying leakers of sensitive government information. On the one hand,
the government claims to be absolutely certain of the worthiness and
necessity of its cause, both as to its objectives and methods. On the other
hand, it is uncertain about the precise magnitude of the threat posed by those
it fears. With this certitude of purpose, the government seeks to alleviate or
significantly reduce the purported threats to our collective security. To do
this, it either coerces or coopts private entities, such as Internet service
providers and search engine suppliers, to censor or monitor speech that it
believes poses a threat to national security.17 While the context and method
of the government’s censorial enterprise may be new, the forces that
motivate it are not—perfect certainty as to the value of its goal and
uncertainty as to the so-called danger posed by those who it believes seek to
undermine that goal. This is the caldron in which suppression is brewed.18
The flip side of certainty is risk. Understandably, we tend to be risk
averse; we incline towards the safe side of the street. What better statement
of this proposition than Justice Robert Jackson’s eloquent dissent in
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, wherein he warned: “There is danger that, if
the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom,
it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”19 By a
5-4 measure, the Court ignored Jackson’s counsel and sided with Arthur
Terminiello, a Catholic priest who had a knack for being racially
inflammatory, this while an unruly crowd protested outside the auditorium
in which he spoke. Though Jackson’s admonition was not heeded, his words
have echoed down the halls of time and more recently have found a welcome
ear in Judge Richard Posner.20 That said, it is helpful to bear in mind the

16. See Derek Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 867–68, 872 (2012)
(describing new kinds of censorship in digital age). See generally, RONALD K.L. COLLINS &
DAVID M. SKOVER, ROBOTICA: FREE SPEECH AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (forthcoming 2018)
(discussing censorship in a robotized speech context).
17. See Jack Balkin, Old School/New School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296,
2298–99, 2308 (2014) (describing such methods of coercion and co-option).
18. Of course, not all kinds of impermissible regulation of expression by the government
constitute censorship per se. See, e.g., id. at 2330 (referring to “pervasive digital surveillance”).
Generally speaking, in this Essay I mean to be equally critical of such forms of government
regulation as I am of government censorship.
19. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
20. See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
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view of the case for the other side, namely, that one need not laud suicide to
endorse the proposition that the First Amendment, if it is to be meaningful,
must allow for some degree of real risk. After all, to contest “certainty” is
to embrace risk.
In bold terms, the oratorical cry of the First Amendment might be put
thusly: The safe life is not worth living. Time and again, from before the free
speech jurisprudence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in
Abrams v. United States21 to and after that of Justice Stephen Breyer in his
dissent in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,22 the idea of risk enters into
the constitutional equation, as it must. In that respect, Holmes’s hammer hit
the nail right on its jurisprudential head: “[The Constitution] is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment.”23 And experiments, including the
free speech experiment in a democracy, can fail. To permit experimentation
is to risk failure and all that comes with it, including everything from racial
or religious bigotry to socialist or capitalist tyranny. Mindful of that, Justice
Brandeis’ stirring words cannot be repeated too often: “Those who won our
independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political
change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. [They were]
courageous, self-reliant men, with [a] confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular
government . . . .”24
Assuredly, to evoke passages such as the ones above is to play to the
romantic side in us. All right, fair enough. I say that because I do not think
that the First Amendment should be cabined in the quarters of risk-free or
play-it-safe rationality or normativity.25 If anything, we are more in need of
taking free-speech-chances than in refusing them in the name of some
purported certainty, security, or morality. After all, how sure is America of
its liberty if it prosecutes newspaper printers such as Benjamin Bache?26 Or

21. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–30 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Dean
John Wigmore took strong issue with Holmes’s dissent and argued that such thinking could put the
nation at undue and even perilous risk. See THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH
CHRONICLE AND READER 285–89 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2010) [hereinafter THE
FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES].
22. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40–62 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
24. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
25. In this regard, I concede to having been somewhat influenced by my law school classmate
and lifelong friend, Steve Shiffrin. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1993).
26. See JEFFREY A. SMITH, FRANKLIN AND BACHE: ENVISIONING THE ENLIGHTENED
REPUBLIC 83–163 (1990) (describing Bache’s criticism of Presidents Washington and Adams,
Federalist lawmakers, and resulting prosecution of the Philadelphia printer).
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if it jails comedians like Lenny Bruce? Or how self-confident is America
in its morality if it silences the poetry of Allen Ginsberg’s “Howl”?28 Or
how committed are we to free speech values when our Supreme Court
countenances government retribution against prosecutors who publicly
criticize the legitimacy of a search warrant?29 Or how sure are we liberals of
our own liberality when we run abortion protestors out of public parks
because their visual messages strike some of us as too horrific?30 The basic
point is: When the government plays it too safe, it soon enough plays the
card of the censor.
In the more modern past, this mindset has taken refuge in many quarters
of the liberal community, especially in the liberal legal academy. It began
in earnest at least twenty years ago when The Nation published an issue titled
“Speech and Power”31 in which liberals, such as Owen Fiss, C. Edwin Baker,
and Cass Sunstein, took aim at the protective side of our First Amendment
jurisprudence as it applied to commercial speech, corporate speech, and
campaign financing. In other publishing venues, liberals such as Catharine
MacKinnon targeted pornography.32 Today, much of the liberal ire is once
again directed at hate speech.33 And why all this liberal animus against
protecting speech rights? The answer is, there is a perception that such

27. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE TRIALS OF LENNY BRUCE: THE
FALL AND RISE OF AN AMERICAN ICON 267–313 (2002).
28. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, MANIA: THE STORY OF THE
OUTRAGED AND OUTRAGEOUS LIVES THAT LAUNCHED A CULTURAL REVOLUTION 251–319, 347–
48 (2013). Owing to current FCC indecency standards, “Howl” cannot be read during most waking
hours on broadcast radio or television. See Patricia Cohen, “Howl” in an Era That Fears
Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at E3 (describing unsuccessful effort to air “Howl” on
broadcast radio).
29. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). In Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014),
the Court did temper Garcetti a bit, at least in cases involving the potential of perjured testimony
in a criminal case.
30. See Adam Liptak, In Abortion Protests, Which to Protect, Children or Speech? N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2013, at A13, and Emily Bazelon, The Supreme Court’s First Amendment
Cowardice, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/juris
prudence/2013/08/gruesome_abortion_photos_and_the_supreme_court_the_justices_refuse_to_st
and.html.
31. Speech and Power, 265 THE NATION 11 (July 21, 1997).
32. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
33. See, e.g., MARI MATSUDA & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993), and K-Sue Park, The
A.C.L.U. Needs to Rethink Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2017, at A23 (arguing the ACLU
should “rethink how it understands free speech. By insisting on a narrow reading of the First
Amendment, the organization provides free legal support to hate-based causes. More troubling,
the legal gains on which the ACLU rests its colorblind logic have never secured real freedom or
even safety for all.”). See also Ronald K.L. Collins, Hate Speech Is Vile—And Protected, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2017 (discussing hate speech on college campuses).
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protections place other liberal values (e.g., equality) in jeopardy. In other
words, when the risk factor entered the liberal tent, many of those who once
defended it turned into the ones who sought to cabin it.
The philosopher Heraclitus once quipped: “Nothing endures but
change.”34 From a societal and cultural point of view, what makes
Heraclitus’s axiom so problematic is that it wars with established norms
about life and the afterlife and everything in between. Insofar as First
Amendment freedoms allow individuals to rail against the status quo and to
rally for change, they too stand to be judged critically and even harshly. The
status quo is typically the status of society; in some foundational sense it is
necessarily averse to change. That is why Socrates (the individual) and
philosophy (the pursuit) were seen as enemies of the state. Viewed through
that prism, the First Amendment represents the institutionalization of the
Socratic way, though with far broader boundaries and far rougher edges. If
that is so, it is little wonder that when this nation was legally constituted its
supreme law did not contain a First Amendment. Pause, and think about it:
If you are trying to forge a Union, you cannot really afford to have the Patrick
Henry and George Mason bunch upset the constitutional applecart with
endless criticisms and calls for change. True, Article V of the Constitution
of 1787 did allow for fundamental changes, but it made the process
burdensome and supermajoritarian. The First Amendment, by constitutional
contrast, was a “quick fix.” It permitted individuals to speak, print, petition,
and even assemble for radical change, be it for religious liberty or political
freedom or neither. In other words, it allowed them to stir the political pot.
But when a nation is new, when it is still constituting itself, it will be
disinclined to be so open-minded as to risk its own perpetuation. At that
stage in its development, fear of change seems inevitable. Politically
speaking, it is amazing that the First Amendment ever became law, at least
at such a tender point in our history. What is not surprising, however, is the
backlash that followed—the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which were
all too predictable. Most assuredly, the members of the Fifth Congress knew
they were abridging speech. They knew they were abridging the rights of
the anti-federalists; and they knew that all of this was contrary to a
constitutional amendment that had become the supreme law of the land only
seven years earlier. So why did they do it? Fear. They feared change; they
feared exactly the kind of change that the First Amendment, if left
unabridged, allowed the anti-federalists to call for.
It should not be startling that in the history between 1791 and now, the
First Amendment has been abridged countless times. Why? Because in a

34.

Quoted in 1 W. K. C. GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 435, 449–54 (1967).
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very real sense it (by its very nature) poses a real danger to society. And
what is that danger? CHANGE, or the prospect of it. Lest we forget: “Every
idea is an incitement.”35 And when people are incited to act, they sometimes
change their ways. Settled societies, however, dislike change. They do not
embrace what is different; they do not smile kindly on the outsider; and they
certainly do not like to encourage Galileo types to rearrange their moral
universe. Strange as it must seem, the First Amendment calls on societies to
be risk tolerant, which (if we are to be fair) is asking a lot. If we but stop
momentarily to dwell on it, our constitutional law as embodied in the First
Amendment is squarely at odds with many of the basic precepts of the great
political philosophers. That law, faithfully applied, protects not only the
modern-day Socrates (who was far more radical than typically understood)
but also those whom Socrates condemned (such as the sophists). Virtually
all of exceptions to the First Amendment as crafted by the courts36 can be
seen as attempts to rein in the radical world of the guaranty, a world where
no settled idea or norm or belief is safe.
If there is a lesson here (as with the one gleaned from the trial of
Galileo), it is to be leery of those leery of change qua change. Remember:
The very idea of the First Amendment invites us to be open to change, or at
least tolerant of it. Think of it as that adversarial intellectual in the parlor or
that badgering radical in the street who, with either refined dialect or course
vernacular, contests much or all of what we hold morally, politically, and
culturally dear. If our system of free expression is working well, it will
permit them to call for an end to some of the very things we are certain are
vital to our continued existence as a civil and God-fearing society. Writ
large, the First Amendment calls on us to live with uncertainty, or some
measure of it.
While we need not be obstructionist Nihilists (note the capitalization),
uncertainty, nonetheless, is a vital part of existence. It contributes both to
our evolutionary and philosophical bounty. By that Camusian logic, the First
Amendment, at least as herein portrayed, ventures to put that uncertainty to
good use. In that process, it neither endorses the canonical imperatives of
the many nor the cynical imperatives of the nihilist few. Justice Anthony
Kennedy captured something of that idea well in the following observation:
When a student first encounters our free speech jurisprudence, he or
she might think it is influenced by the philosophy that one idea is as

35. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. See Ronald K.L. Collins, The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New
Absolutism, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 409, 417–22 (2013) (listing forty-three exceptions to the First
Amendment).
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good as any other, and that in art and literature objective standards of
style, taste, decorum, beauty, and esthetics are deemed by the
Constitution to be inappropriate, indeed unattainable. Quite the
opposite is true. The Constitution no more enforces a relativistic
philosophy or moral nihilism than it does any other point of view.37

Admittedly, there can be a fine line between a healthy Socratic-like
skepticism and an unhealthy nihilist-like cynicism. Even so, that possibility
ought not to blind us to the ever-present need to test the imperatives of the
adherents of both camps who argue with Aristotelian or Hegelian certainty
about the certainty of their claims. This is not a cause for Faustian angst so
much as it is admonition to be skeptical of uncompromising skeptics.
In light of this, the astute reader may well ask: But is not truth the
benchmark of several key tenets of our free speech law, as, for example, in
the law of fraud and defamation? After all, when a man is lied to about the
working condition of the transmission of a used car he purchased, it is no
defense that the state of truth is so much in flux as to justify the swindler’s
lie. Likewise, when someone defames a good woman’s good reputation by
way of knowing falsehoods, the one perpetuating the lie cannot take legal
refuge in the nuances of deconstructionist arguments about truth. Or what
about the intentional lie told to a police officer in order to impede the
administration of justice? Are such lies immune from prosecution because
of the philosopher’s reflective pause about the relationship between truth and
certainty? The answer to all of these queries is, of course, in the question
itself. Undoubtedly, we need some amount of perceived truth in order to live
much of our daily lives.
Still, if we step back and think of what is at really issue, it is not entirely
clear that the demand for truth is what always drives the engine of free speech
law. That is, we demand truth (or our current perception of it) insofar as
knowing falsehoods produce actual and significant harms to others. Just
consider the heralded opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan38 or the
more recent ruling in Alvarez v. United States39—in both cases truth lost out
to the liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment. And why? The answer
inheres in a libertarian principle. And harm is that principle. If falsehoods—
e.g., exaggerations, puffery, white lies, or satirical swipes—produce no real

37. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (allowing for certain kinds of
defamation of public officials).
39. Alvarez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (protecting certain kinds of false
statements concerning Stolen Valor medals). See also United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d. 666,
666–77 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
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harm, or if they produce the kind of harm that is socially acceptable on
balance, then their falsity is of little or no actual concern to us.

Let me raise a few questions here: If some of those in the free speech
community suffer from a kind of First Amendment hypertrophy, might it be
that their First Amendment theories are so swollen with their own pet valueladen norms that they fail to take sufficient account of the obvious? Could
it be that any perceived threat (no matter how real) to their prized norms (no
matter how inflated) is enough for some to deny a free expression claim?
That is, are some theories, some so norm-obsessed and value-inflated, that
there is little breathing space for First Amendment freedom? In such
instances, could it be that the presence or likelihood of real harm, even if
obliquely addressed, is discounted?40 Hence, if the harm factor, properly
understood and applied, is what primarily fuels various free speech theories,
then maybe more time and attention need to be focused on considering the
typologies of harm.41
Of course, harm is quite often linked to some norm. Consider, for
example, the proposition that pornography is harmful to women. The norms
to be safeguarded are equality and safety (as in a world safe from the rape
“caused” by pornography, etc.).42 Such norms are offered up in categorical
terms and thus in need of certain special kinds of protection. The free speech
problem, of course, is that once these norms and their conceptual offspring
are let loose, they first circle and then fence in the domain of free speech—
they thus abridge that freedom of speech or of the press. If the First
Amendment is indeed the first freedom in our legal and philosophical
scheme of rights, it may be owing to the fact that the idea behind it was to
constitutionalize the risk factor and thus make it an indispensable part of all
free expression analysis. That is, wherever we may draw the harm line, some
element of risk must remain. And that measure of risk, if I may be so daring,
must be meaningful and must expose us to some actual and present dangers.
Again, life is an experiment and experiments fail. This idea of meaningful
risk—of taking real chances—is central if only because without it free
expression could be abridged at the drop of a normative dime. Holmes’s

40. Notably, when such harm is absent, even malicious motives cannot defeat a First
Amendment claim. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (upholding the right to
demonstrate near military funeral).
41. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81
(2011); Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993).
42. See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
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“experiment,” Brandeis’s “risks,” and Brennan’s echo of it all lead readily
towards the path of contingency and away from the house of Certainty.
Let us not speak falsely: If the First Amendment is to mean anything, it
must mean that some actual and not insignificant degree of harm or offense
or risk must be endured. Otherwise, what is the point of such a constitutional
guaranty if it protects only the speech or expression or ideas or principles or
values of which a majority approves? After all, it may be that offensive
speech may cause civic disorder, that certain ideas will blossom into harmful
practices, that expression is so close to abhorrent conduct that police action
seems necessary, that particular types of expression are so vile and base as
to degrade the norms of a civilized society, that expression amplified by
technological advances if left largely unchecked will present heretofore
insurmountable problems, that government secrets if made public might
jeopardize our national security, and that hate speech will undermine our
egalitarian ideals. If the reflexive response to such understandable fears is
censorship, then the real purpose of the First Amendment will become more
ceremonial and less operational, and more made for a glorious graduation
speech than for a needed judicial decision in defense of some moral leper or
some political ranter run amok.
I wonder if there can be any worthwhile interpretation of the First
Amendment unless we first concede that risk (and that means the acceptance
of some degree of genuine harm) is a vital part of the conceptual equation.
There is more here than mere balancing, because insofar as the First
Amendment is concerned, the thumb of risk should already be on the scales
tilting in favor of free speech protection. Thus understood, a societal claim
of sixty percent detriment might well lose to a First Amendment claim of
forty percent benefit. One of the problems with ad hoc balancing is that it
all too regularly ignores the presumption in favor of free speech or the tilt in
its favor and proceeds to balance as if the scales were even at the outset.
Thus, the weight of the free speech interest is balanced against that of the
societal value,46 with some deference to the state’s determinations of its

43. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
45. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
46. See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). More recently, jurists such as Justice Stephen Breyer and scholars such as Robert
Post have gone even further and have attempted to recalibrate the strict scrutiny and compelling
interest equations in ways less protective of individual free speech liberty. See STEPHEN BREYER,
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006); ROBERT POST,
CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
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assertion of societal values and with little or no exacting examination of the
purported harms said to be caused by the speech in question.47
In all of this, it is important to note that it is far easier for the State to
allege normative or societal harms buttressed by attenuated proof of such
ambiguous harms than it is for the State to clearly demonstrate actual harms
caused to persons or their property. For that reason alone, ad hoc balancing
frequently adds little or nothing to safeguarding First Amendment freedoms.
In fact, ad hoc balancing typically trades the mandate of the First
Amendment for a kind of common law balancing and thus returns our
constitutional order to its pre-1791 status. If the First Amendment is to have
any staying power, it cannot stand on an equal footing with any and all socalled societal or normative values. Rather, it must, at the outset, be
presumed to reflect a weightier social interest that can only be overcome by
proof of actual harm to persons, property or to the administration of justice.
So, when we think about the spectrum of harms, how might we proceed,
at least broadly speaking? By way of a sketch of an answer, we might ask:









Is the purported harm more speculative or actual?
How reliable is the evidence tendered?48
Who is really harmed and how?
What is the imminence and gravity of the purported
harm?
If the harm is indeed actual, grave, and intentional or
reckless,49 what is its likely scope?
To what extent is the called-for censorship
specifically tailored to remedying the alleged harm
and how likely is it that it can do so?
Can the harm specified and demonstrated be remedied
by non-censorial methods?
What is the likely duration of the actual and grave
harm, and will censorship continue beyond the point?

47. See Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 207[3][b] (“Freedom of speech does not start on a level
playing field because courts will tend to defer to legislative judgments that have already struck a
balance against free speech.”) (footnote omitted).
48. This question raises the ever-thorny matter of how to evaluate evidence where there is a
conflict of interest, as in industry-financed research. In this particular regard, I am inclined to agree
with much of Professor Lessig’s thinking and his admonition to be skeptical of (or at least cautious
about) such evidence. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 29 (2011).
49. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255 (2014).
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A few examples may help to explain my thinking here:
(1) Assume that someone was to say publicly that “the
vast majority of female students at Walt Whitman
High School take illegal drugs and engage in illicit sex
in public places.” Any alleged harm here is not likely
to be actual because it is speculative in that the group
is too ill defined; the “of and concerning”
requirement50 of the First Amendment has been
fashioned to address precisely such matters.
(2) As to the who is harmed question: Assume that a court
enjoins the display of “gruesome” antiabortion
material (a.k.a. political, moral, and religious
advocacy) in a traditional public forum, in order to
protect the sensibilities of children.51 Harm to
children may be possible, but their protection comes
at the expense of content-based restrictions that
censor rights of adults to express such sentiments and
the corresponding rights of other adults to receive and
evaluate them.52
(3) Consider next the gravity of the purported harm in
Abrams v. United States.53 While it may be that, in
the abstract, the threat posed in 1918-19 by the
dissident provocateurs could damage the war effort, in
moderated retrospect it appears that the threat was
more the product of war hysteria than of anything real.

50. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267, 288 (1964).
51. See Scott v. Saint John’s Church in Wilderness, 194 P.3d 475 (Colo. Ct. App., 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 33 (2013) (author of this Essay signed onto an amicus brief prepared by
Bruce Johnson in support of the Petitioner).
52. There is also the value of such free speech to children themselves. See Am. Amusement
Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that children below voting
age “must be allowed the freedom to form their political views on the basis of uncensored speech
before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise”).
53. Professor Chafee referred to the Bolshevik-inspired speech in that case as “harmless
folly.” See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 140 (1948). Holmes
himself thought the judiciary sometimes “rather hysterical” in its response to dissident expression.
See, e.g., Letter from Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (Mar. 26, 1919), in THE FUNDAMENTAL
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 224; Letter from Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 16, 1919), in THE
FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 21 at 224; Letter from Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 25,
1920), in in THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 21, at 290 (regarding Holmes’s criticism of
Wigmore’s all too “emotion[al]” commentary on the Abrams dissent).
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(4) Insofar as the scope of the harm is concerned, it may
be that “protective bubbles” shield women entering
Planned Parenthood centers from the taunts of selfrighteous antiabortionists54 or that designated “free
speech zones” protect the president and other highranking government officials from danger. But how
real is the danger of actual harm and how far is too far
to safeguard against that? More importantly, are such
censorial practices designed more to quell offensive
expression than to protect people?
All of the above examples also point to the need of laws that are
carefully tailored to protect First Amendment interests even if some degree
of harm were to occur. The overbreadth doctrine does considerable
spadework in this conceptual field. By much the same reasoning, censorial
measures that win the judicial day in wartime ought not to prevail in later
years by way of holdover laws (statutory or decisional) when the imminent
need for such abridgements has vanished. Having said all of this, let me
dig a little deeper, and turn over a few normative rocks to see what hides
beneath them.

At its heart, the debate between Galileo and his ecclesiastical detractors
was not over science understood as facts, but rather over science understood
as values (loosely defined). In the process, the is of the world (its scientific
facts) was confused with the ought of life (its normative values). And in that
universe, where the sun hovers at the center of all things, norms trump
science just as beliefs prevail over facts. In the mix, certainty either took a
back seat to faith or was redefined to comport with it. Again, consider the
phrase “moral certainty.” In its own peculiar way, this not too innocent
phrase reveals how questions of is and ought can be fused together in the
unsuspecting and uncritical mind. That said, one might ask: So how does
this play out in the First Amendment scheme of things? Let me offer three
examples in which questions of fact (scientific matters) yield to questions of
value (normative matters) with the consequence of compelling individuals
to adhere to the belief systems of the State no matter how demonstrably false
those systems are.

54. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (striking down Massachusetts law
regarding buffer zones around abortion clinics on First Amendment grounds). See Brief for Eugene
Volokh et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014)
(No. 12-1168) (providing detail on one side of the issue).
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With alarming frequency, more and more states compel doctors
performing abortions to provide women with state-sanctioned information
(actually religious propaganda) about the purported dangers of abortion. To
illustrate: South Dakota law55 requires abortion providers to tell their patients
that the incidents of mental health problems in women are greater for those
who have had abortions. Though this is highly misleading at best,56 the facts
of the science of the matter have succumbed to the norms of “pro-life”
advocates. In some significant respects, this marks the return of the rule of
the Congregation of the Index.
By way of another example, recall the arguments of the radical
feminists who once argued that pornography incites men to commit rapes
and other acts of violence against women.57 Hence, to tolerate pornography
was to endorse discrimination against women58 contrary to the equality
commands of the Constitution.59 However rhetorically powerful such
arguments might have once been, at their base they lacked the kind of
scientific proof necessary to vindicate the normative claims made.60 Here,

55. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2017) (“suicide advisory”), upheld in
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2012).
56. See Susan A. Cohen, Still True: Abortion Does not Increase Women’s Risk of Mental
Health Problems, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Spring 2013 at 13 (in the interest of full disclosure,
the author of the article cited in this footnote is my spouse).
57. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 15–18, 20, 62, 96–97 (1993). The case
of “revenge porn” is importantly different insofar as it,
‘transforms individuals’ most intimate moments into pornographic spectacles exposed to
the general public. A vengeful ex-partner or malicious hacker can upload an explicit
image of a victim to a website where thousands of people can view it and hundreds of
other websites can share it. In a matter of days, that image can dominate the first several
pages of ‘hits’ on the victim’s name in a search engine, as well as being emailed or
otherwise exhibited to the victim’s family, employers, co-workers, and peers. Nonconsensual pornography can destroy victims’ intimate relationships as well as their
educational and employment opportunities.
Kaimipono D. Wenger, Legal Developments in Revenge Porn: An Interview with Mary Anne
Franks, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 10, 2013), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/
10/legal-developments-in-revenge-porn-an-interview-with-mary-anne-franks.html. If indeed there
were such demonstrable harms, a properly and narrowly drawn statute, replete with the requisite
mens rea requirements along with provision for certain exceptions, should be able to withstand
constitutional challenge.
58. See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 24–36, 58–66 (1988).
59. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986) (rejecting such claims of sexual discrimination).
60. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 247–64 (2000) (refuting the claim that antipornography laws would
reduce violence or discrimination against women).
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too, the is of the matter was conflated with its ought with the liberty
guaranteed by the First Amendment hanging in the balance.
Consider as well the example that gave rise to the controversy in Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,61 the violent video game case in which it
was argued that viewing such games actually induces or influences, either
directly or otherwise, young players to commit acts of violence. Once again,
what drove the State’s claim was the norm of the matter more so than the
fact of the matter, though the two were loosely lumped together. Thus, the
State of California argued that “the First Amendment does not demand proof
of a direct causal link between exposure to violent video games and harm to
minors.”62 In that regard, and in an amicus brief filed in the case, Robert
Corn-Revere made the following telling observation:
In the well-rehearsed script of the typical moral panic, . . . science has
been used less as a tool for understanding than as currency to be
exchanged for political leverage. As a result, the policy debates in this
area a mélange of social science mixed with politics and advocacy,
and rarely is there a clear dividing line between the researchers and
the advocates. See, e.g., David Trend, The Myth of Media Violence
45-49 (2007). The debate over media violence has followed the
standard script, dominated by “reactionary rhetoric, flawed research,
and distorted accounts of legitimate scientific studies.”63

These examples reveal that the old ways of the Congregation of the
Index manifest themselves anew whenever science and faith, or facts and
values, are conflated. When functioning properly, the expression clauses of
the First Amendment keep the State’s faith and norms at bay in order to
safeguard the rights of the individual whose own sun does not rise and set in
the officially approved way. Moreover, in matters touching upon free
expression and its correlates, the First Amendment prevents the government
from masquerading as a fact finder when in truth it is a norm enforcer.64
61. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
62. Brief for Petitioner at 45–48, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786
(2011) (the petitioner’s case name was subsequently changed to Brown).
63. Brief for Comic Book Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
16–17, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448) (quoting
DAVID TREND, THE MYTH OF MEDIA VIOLENCE 48 (2007)). Consistent with what is said in the
text above, Mr. Corn-Revere titled this section of his brief “From Sin to ‘Science’ and Back Again.”
Id. at 16. See also Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
64. Much the same point was made by Justice Anthony Kennedy: “The Constitution exists
precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral judgments about art and
literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is that these judgments
are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval
of a majority.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
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Before proceeding further down any more philosophical paths, it might
be useful to clear a little more legal brush in order to see how the operation
of our current free speech doctrine fits, if at all, into all of this. Though I
will return to the philosophical side of things, I think it salutary to flag a few
related ideas about the wording of the First Amendment and the decisional
law developed under it. Permit me to explain why.

While not investing too heavily in the mechanistic determinism of
originalist and textualist jurisprudence, let us continue by considering (if
only by way of a reflective aside) the wording of the First Amendment. This
perhaps will allow us to better appreciate how it might be said to speak to
the larger idea behind Galileo’s purported quip. There is one word that is
particularly relevant here; it is the word “abridging.” It is an old-fashioned
word. It derives from the Middle English (deprive) and before that from the
Old French (abbreviate), and before that from the Latin (cut short). For
example, when a book or story is abbreviated by cutting short its narrative,
the abridgement deprives the reader of the complete message. The term
“abridge” was the word used by our founders, but not those who drafted the
Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of 1787 or even the early
state declarations of rights. It made its American debut in the First
Amendment: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”65
So why that word? Why not other words such as “respecting” (as in
the Establishment Clause), or “prohibiting” (as in the Free Exercise Clause),
or “restrained” (as in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights), or “deprived”
(as used in Madison’s June 8, 1789, proposal to the House), or “infringed”
(as used in a July 28, 1789, House Committee Report)? Well, it is hard to
say with certainty since the surviving historical records reveal little.
Supreme Court decisions say little, and scholarship on the matter is meager.
And while the word is commonplace in constitutional parlance, it is
nonetheless a word about which we are never quite sure of its meaning.
Rather, we skip by any thought of it, much as a man chasing butterflies
ignores the plant life—like Queen Anne’s Lace, violets, marigolds, and
maybe even milkweed—vital to the existence of butterflies.
Etymologically speaking, abridging is when someone else, particularly
the government, cuts off what we say or write. To abridge is to abbreviate,
to command approved brevity. Or as Samuel Johnson’s 1755 dictionary
65. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
83–128 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I) (emphasis added).
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66

defined it: “To contract, to diminish, to cut short.” Such a demand means
that a censor—one who scrutinizes a work for objectionable content—can
shorten any message by deleting as much as he or she wishes.
Constitutionally speaking, all of this is abhorrent because we should be able
to speak our minds uninterrupted. The dialogue must continue; the book
must be read; and the show must go on and on. Thus, no “prior restraints”
on freedom of speech or of the press.
By this logic, to permit the government to abridge expression is to allow
for the perpetuation of half-truths, or a one-sided views of things, or a onesize-fits-all code of principles. One only gets the side of the truth or
argument or view of whatever the government wants us to hear or read or
see, but no more. In the name of censorial brevity, the “whole truth” is not
permitted and neither is the “full story” or the “uncut” movie or the
unabridged novel. Censors—be they in Burma or Cuba or Alabama—fear
the specter of the abundance of unabridged communicative liberty. They
like to call things to an end; they prefer their truths settled; and they are
certain when there is enough information in the marketplace and whom can
best dispense it there.
Without being categorical, this old-fashioned Madisonian textual idea
was one that equated abridging with government attempts to “cut short” the
many messages of “We the People.” Half-truths, condensed government
records, redacted government documents, abridged literary works, wordsanitized radio programming, image-sanitized TV programing, and
campaign restrictions might thus be seen (at least sometimes) as antithetical
to a vibrant First Amendment. Such practices trade government ordered
brevity for the fullness of freedom. They halt what should be ongoing,
namely an ongoing exchange of communication, even of the offensive kind.
In a very real (and conceptual) sense, the First Amendment rebooted the
mission of the Constitution of 1787. The original conceptual model was that
government could only censor expression if it was expressly authorized by
law to do so, meaning authorized by some provision of the Constitution and
then by some duly enacted law. But that was far too slender a reed for the
Anti-Federalists who sensed, and correctly so, that such an approach was too
elastic and would not secure the kind of protection they thought worthy of a
constitutional democracy. When they prevailed, and when thereafter
decisional law invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to expand free speech
liberty,67 the First Amendment became the supreme law. In doing so, the

66. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 61 (1755).
67. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
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constitutional scheme of things became twofold insofar as free expression
was concerned: (1) government could only do what it was authorized to do,
and (2) even when authorized it must not abridge those freedoms protected
under the First Amendment. By that measure, all citizens could assert more
freedom. They could now point to a constitutional provision that
recognized their right to speak out against their government. That it took
a long duration of time for that principle to be honored as a matter of
judicial review does not deny the significance of this monumental moment
in our constitutional history.
If one thinks about it, over the long run the First Amendment typically
ratchets forward; it protects ever more and more expression and thus limits
government power more and more. And when it does so, it contests what
was once deemed to be certain and beyond question. It tests truths, contests
beliefs, and questions values that past generations deemed important enough
to override the ravages of hostile or offensive expression.
There is more at stake here than the words of our supreme law and what
those words connote in our minds when we pause to think of them and what
they might signify. There is also the law itself and how it plays out in
operation vis-à-vis concerns over certainty. That is, how does the doctrinal
law of the First Amendment respond to claims of certainty or claims based
on alleged propositions grounded in certainty or near certainty?

Ever since certain jurists and First Amendment scholars got a
theoretical whiff of Judge Learned Hand’s incitement test68 and Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s clear-and-present danger test,69 there has been a
march to follow such conceptual scents. What we might observe about this
movement (about which I will say more in a moment) is that it might be seen
as a jurisprudential move to contest the certainty of those who claim that
particular types of speech should not be constitutionally protected. That is,
sometimes it is not enough for government censors to merely allege harm,
but instead, they must go to great lengths to demonstrate its existence or
likelihood. Hence, by the time the law got to Brandenburg v. Ohio70 some
half a century later, the censors’ feet were being held to the doctrinal fire.
By that time, the same certainty that once claimed surefire danger in the
speech of the likes of Charles Schenck, Eugene Debs, Jacob Abrams, and
Anita Whitney, came to be judged in much more skeptical terms. In the
process, some of the certainty of the past gave way to the skepticism of the
68.
69.
70.

See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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present. The censor’s claims of certainty had to do battle with the reviewing
courts’ demands for scrutiny. Just consider the vernacular of the various free
speech tests that came on the scene between 1919 and 1969:










71.
72.
73.
74.

Schenck v. United States (Holmes for the Court): “The
question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”71
Abrams v. United States (Holmes dissenting): “[T]he
United States constitutionally may punish speech that
produces or is intended to produce a clear and
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith
certain substantive evils that the United States
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”72
Gitlow v. New York (Holmes dissenting): “[W]hatever
may be thought of the redundant discourse before us
it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If
in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.”73
Whitney v. California (Brandeis concurring): “That
the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction
does not exist unless speech would produce, or is
intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of
some substantive evil which the state constitutionally
may seek to prevent has been settled.”74
Brandenburg v. Ohio (per curiam): “[T]he
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing

Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”75
In this list of doctrinal tests we see the Justices expressing skepticism
about claims of purported dangers, a shift from the prior presumption of
reasonable certainty. To the extent that more certainty of such harms is
demanded, there is a corresponding degree of real risk. Granted, there are
hard cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project76 where there has
been functional pushback. Even so, the insistence for more certainty of harm
finds expression in the modern line of commercial speech cases such as
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,77 where censorial claims of harm have been
more closely scrutinized. To much the same effect, rules such as the
overbreadth doctrine78 and the narrowly tailored doctrine79 rein in the realm
of censorship by demanding more exacting line drawing and likewise urging
avoidance of censorship if possible. And then there is the Roberts Court’s
seemingly uncompromising approach to protecting speech unless it is
categorically subject to a traditional free speech exception.80 In all of these
ways, and still others, certainty is very much a concern of modern free speech
jurisprudence, though unlike the past, today certainty is often the very card
that defeats the censor’s own hand.
There is more to be considered insofar as our focus remains on certainty
and how it interacts with censorship. For example, in the era of the Roberts
Court, the certainty and risk dynamic move along nontraditional free speech
tracks. Just consider the fact that Milton and Meiklejohn no longer rule the
jurisprudential roost of the First Amendment. Likewise, the normative
importance of truth is a currency that is decreased all too regularly. Rather,
the First Amendment is called into the mechanical service81 of those who
trade in animal “crush videos”82 and violent video games,83 along with those
who lie about military medals84 and others who feel called upon by Great

75. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
76. Holder, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
77. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
78. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997).
79. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986).
80. See Collins, supra note 36.
81. See Collins, supra note 36, at 414–24 (discussing and critiquing use of the “traditional
exceptions” to the First Amendment approach to judicial decision-making).
82. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
83. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
84. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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God to protest near military funerals. And then there is the issue of the
First Amendment being tapped in the service of corporations eager to spend
untold amounts of money to endorse the candidates they support and oppose
those they condemn.86
The takeaway: Those overriding norms that at one time seemed so
central to any notion of free speech no longer have the same cache that they
once may have enjoyed. To the extent that they are even invoked, they are
done so in a decorative manner as by way of rhetorical embellishment or
what have you. Insofar as the articulation of the law is concerned, much free
speech normative thinking (classic and contemporary) is operationally inert,
however in vogue it may be in the legal academy. In short, there is much
less certainty about which norms should or should not be the conceptual
touchstone for deciding First Amendment cases. And that means that raw
risk calculations ratchet up proportionally, thus leaving us more risk prone.
With all of the above said, let us next consider, albeit in a cursory way,
the relationship between certainty, risk, and adversity.87 The word adverse
derives from the Latin adversus, meaning against or opposite. Assuredly,
Galileo the heretic was an adversary of the governing body and its governing
norms; his views concerning the heliocentric theory of Copernicus were
adverse to those of the Church. In that sense, then, his message was
adversarial, meaning in clear opposition to the tenets of the Holy Apostolic
Truth. And were the Church Fathers to tolerate Galileo’s scientific gospel,
they risked putting their own truths in jeopardy . . . or so they feared. Judged
by such considerations, the adversarial voice—the voice of the other—is one
that tests, on the one hand, the censorial limits placed on free speech by those
certain of their belief systems or, on the other hand, challenges the belief
systems of those uncertain of the viability of their beliefs—the ones thus in
need of government intervention in order to perpetuate them by censorial
measures. Where certainty rules, such adversity is vital, if only to test timeand-again the premises that inform it and the logic that implements it.
Adversity cuts both ways; that is, it should also turn inwards to a
willingness to test the certainty of one’s own views. Quite often the
rebellious are so self-righteous that they fail to see the shortcomings of their
own rants. While the First Amendment should nonetheless protect them

85. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).
86. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2011).
87. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–27, 176–81 (2013) (describing and defending
role of adversarial expression in a democratic society).
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(recall New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ), this does not mean that their
messages are beyond critique and criticism. The give-and-take envisioned
by the ideal of the First Amendment stands to do just that, provided one
keeps an open mind. Or to cast it as the discerning and ever-skeptical Justice
Holmes did: “To have doubted one’s own first principles is the mark of a
civilized man.”89 Better still, in a 1925 letter to Lewis Einstein, Holmes took
it a step further: “Scepticism is a saving grace if it takes in enough of
oneself.”90 Ironically, sometimes the adversarial figure is so critical of
certain things that she is unable to appreciate the value of self-criticism.
“The greatest dangers to liberty,” Justice Brandeis cautioned, “lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.”91 While a healthy First Amendment culture surely needs
adversarial types (offensive92 and aggregating as they can be), it also needs
others willing to contest the kind of adversarial certainty that honors no view
other than its own.

Just to be clear: Not all First Amendment jurisprudential configurations
fit neatly into the box of the certainty-risk notion I have been discussing.
Things like properly crafted laws concerning actual fraud, real trade secrets,
true threats, genuine copyright violations, actual child pornography, and the
like continue to demand a different calculation.93 We are less willing to take

88. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recognizing an almost
absolute First Amendment right to defame public officials).
89. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideas and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1915).
90. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (June 1, 1925), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS 241–42 (James B. Peabody ed., 1964).
91. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
92. That we protect such speech has been deemed to be a proud tenet of our free speech
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“But no matter how the point
is phrased, [the government’s] unmistakable thrust is this: The Government has an interest in
preventing speech expressing ideas that offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the
heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’ United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).”).
93. Even so, when invoking such labels, it is well to remember the following important
admonition:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give
any more weight to the epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law. . . .
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity,
solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of
expression that have been challenged in this court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity
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any risks in these areas (though even here there is some leeway at the
definitional level). This is but another way of saying that our everemerging law concerning the various forms of modern free speech is not
easily contained under a single conceptual umbrella. If at one time we
tended to move in that direction (e.g., Thomas Emerson’s “Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment”94), then that time seems to have
passed insofar as we now seem to be moving away from such all-purpose
theories. Quite apart from the historical development of free speech law
and how it has evolved in modern times, there is also a deeper point to be
pondered. It, too, concerns certainty and how it is that we buy into it . . .
step by conceptual step. Isaiah Berlin once remarked that “[i]deas are the
commodity in which intellectuals deal.”95 Indeed. And how many in that
crowd—be they in philosophy, history, or law—love to invest in some
grand unitary idea by which all in life or law can be explained by way of a
single architectonic claim? In this regard, let us reflect upon yet another
sentiment tendered by Mr. Berlin: “I’ve got no . . . terrible interest,” he
once declared offhandedly, “in people with a single vision; on the contrary,
I think them very grand, important geniuses, but dangerous.”96 Nice!
Judged by that standard, free speech giants of the order of John Milton or
Alexander Meiklejohn—along with their modern-day adherents (who veer
here and there, but remain true to some fetishized creed of an
Enlightenment or Democratic Governance ideal)—may well be geniuses.
Something of the same might be said of seasoned Originalists or savvy
Textualists. Yet even granting that, Mr. Berlin warns us that they are
dangerous. Why? Without venturing to speak for the late social theorist,
let me offer a few ideas, at least as they might operate in the First
Amendment arena.
If one is a “single vision” scholar of the Aristotelian school, then he
looks for the telos of things—that is, the purpose of something or the end
towards which it aims. Of course, such pursuits are premised on the
foundational idea that all things have both such singular purposes and that
we can discern them. By the same token, if one is a “single vision” scholar
of the Enlightenment school, then he looks for the ways—scientific and

from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (citation & footnotes omitted).
94. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963).
95. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF
HISTORY 27 (Henry Hardy ed., 2d ed., 2013).
96. Id. at 102.
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social—that the world can be explained in some comprehensive and
intelligible way. Yet again, if one is a “single vision” scholar of the
Democratic Governance school, then he or she looks for all the ways by
which government, in all its diverse aspects, can be reconciled with that
overriding idea. In the philosophical process, everything from the laws of
gravity to the laws of free speech is categorized or characterized or
compartmentalized to comport with some Grand Unitary Vision (“GUV”).
And what does not fit into that scheme of things is either marginalized or
ostracized. To translate this into to First Amendment terms, speech that is at
odds with the GUV is deemed unworthy of constitutional protection and thus
carrion for insatiable censors.97 In such a world, there is haughty confidence
rather than humble uncertainty.
Certainty sometimes manifests itself in the most striking ways when we
close our minds. In this regard, we may be entirely certain of the Truth of
our own cause or of the Evil of another’s cause so as to demand that our side
of the story be the Whole Truth. It all comes out the same in the censorial
wash. Something of the same holds true for how we think about the First
Amendment and how we theorize about it. Whether it be Milton or
Meiklejohn, the Enlightenment principle or the checking function, or selfrealization or democratization, such theories serve to cabin speech, curb
expression, or cut short some idea or ideology or way of communicating
something from one person to another. This is so even when such theories
of truth might advance the cause of free speech in the short run but restrict it
in the long run. Simply consider the case of the famed free speech theorist
Alexander Meiklejohn (1872-1974).98 Unquestionably, his bold views
helped to usher in a new and liberating mindset in our First Amendment
jurisprudence, which was quite important in the years leading up to, during,
and shortly after the McCarthy era. Then again, Zechariah Chafee (who had
rallied to Meiklejohn’s defense when Amherst’s trustees fired him for
unpopular ideas99) criticized the great scholar’s free speech norms when he
took skeptical aim at them in a Harvard Law Review article—Meiklejohn’s
public versus private speech dichotomy, Zechariah maintained, was both ill-

97. For a contemporary example of such GUV free speech thinking, see ROBERT C. POST,
CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); or by way of
an originalist GUV, see Akhil Amar, The First Amendment’s Firstness, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1015 (2014).
98. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE:
STORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 39–58 (2011).
99. See Meiklejohn Quits Amherst: Trustees Urge Retirement, WASH. POST, June 20, 1923,
at 2.
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conceived and capable of being applied to censor science, art, drama, and
poetry.100
It is both ironic and accurate that theories of free speech liberty can pave
the way for censorship. If time is on truth’s side, it is mainly because truth
is not static; it is often molded to the different times and circumstances in
which it finds itself. It evolves much like a giant oak, too slow to be seen by
an untrained eye, but too big to be ignored by any eye. Though we dare not
say it openly or too loudly, to concede this is to permit a sardonic spoonful
of honey to be added to our overconfident understanding of the eternal mix
of things. But such is life.
GUV thinkers tend to be certain of their theories and equally certain of
the need for society to align itself with such theories. Thus, if you are a strict
GUV follower of the Enlightenment school, expression that is primarily
artistic (say, Jackson Pollock) or entertaining (say, George Carlin) will likely
be beyond the pale of First Amendment protection unless some analytical
liberties are taken in applying that GUV principle. So, too, if you are a GUV
thinker of the Democratic Governance school, expression that is primarily
commercial (say, a Geico commercial) or offered up by for-profit corporate
entities (say, the Nike Co.) may well find itself outside the way of First
Amendment protection. Then again, if your GUV is steeped in some notion
of free speech being inextricably and exclusively linked to the advancement
of the political process, then some racy artistic expression (say, that of Robert
Mapplethorpe) or much sexual expression (say, 50 Shades of Grey) will be
subject to censorial whims. What all these examples have in common in this:
Where there is a GUV theory, there will often be certainty in the first instance
and censorship in the second. In other words, the theory behind censorship
is theory, or at least Grand Theory.
There is yet more: One of the practical consequences of GUV theorizing
is that it forces First Amendment lawyers representing dissident or
unorthodox clients to fabricate constitutional fictions. The job of such
lawyers is to try to place the square peg of their clients’ speech into round
normative holes. Or to vary the metaphor, lawyers must disingenuously
pigeonhole their client’s speech into the normative boxes compatible with
the GUV principle. In the course of things, comedy becomes political action,
erotic sexual expression becomes self-realization, offensive speech becomes
cultural criticism, and imagistic commercial expression becomes consumer
information. Such expression may or may not fairly fall into such categories,
but lawyers should not be forced to perpetuate hypocrisy in order to appease

100. See Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 891 (1949).
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the GUV crowd and thus prevail in court. Strange as it is, in such
circumstances falsity is necessarily called into the service of placing a
normative face on aberrant expression.
If any of this strikes a cord of soundness, then the point to be gleaned
here is that GUV free speech theories first invite censorship and then set out
to legitimize it. The piquancy of such theories is that they seem to turn chaos
into order, danger into safety, harshness into humanity, power into
democracy, while at the same time assuring us that such theories can manage
risk to allowable levels. In such risk-free and safe worlds, pornographers are
kept at bay, the captains of commerce are muzzled, so-called antidemocratic
corporate entities are driven out of the electoral arena, and those who offend
us are relegated to the realm of fenced in “free speech zones.” Though liberty
may not dance with hands waiving free, here is the purported quid pro quo:
our land is SAFE thanks to the GUV that rules over us in ways generally
reminiscent of the Guardians in Plato’s Republic.101
As noted earlier, and given the underlying premises of many so-called
theories of free speech, their practical effect is to diminish the realm of First
Amendment freedom. This is true either as to how free speech is defined102
or how it is balanced against normative considerations. Consequently, such
theories are more appropriately viewed as anti-free speech theories. Why?
Because if speech does not comport with the normative criteria proffered,
then the expression in question loses any claim to constitutional protection.
Put another way, many speech theorists demand that speech prove its
normative worth before it is protected. Here is how it works: They construct
some utopian republic (utopian to them, though perhaps dystopian to us) that
is invented to further illusory ideals and then work backwards from there and
demands that if speech is to be protected it must comport with those ideals.
That speech as speech should be protected, they view as absurd since so
many kinds of expression (ranging from securities fraud to revenge porn to
perjury) are seemingly beyond the pale. Hence, for them, speech must earn
its way to First Amendment protection. It must be tied to the tale of some
utopian kite. Only then can it be legitimated; only then can it assume the
mantle of worthy expression.
But this, I submit, is to flip the First Amendment on its head. The
constitutional premise of the 1791 guaranty should work conversely: Speech
is presumptively protected. It should, that is, be entitled to the protection
that accompanies that presumption absent some subsequent clear
101. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David Skover, The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern
State: Post’s Republic and the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 369 (2012).
102. For example, at one time some did not consider defamation, expressive conduct, sexual
expression, or commercial expression, as speech entitled to First Amendment protection.
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demonstration of an actual, imminent, and significant harm. For the most
part, it need demonstrate no more; it need not bow to the dictates of
Utopian Masters.
In some very fundamental respects, the logic of the First Amendment
cuts against the grain of the GUV crowd. It does so in several ways: First, it
reverses the traditional pre-1791 presumption103 so that it favors free speech
at the outset (“Congress shall make no law”); second, it endorses the idea
that some degree of real risk must be endured and some measure of actual
offense tolerated; third, it does not create rigid and hierarchical categories of
speech (just consider the modern development of the law of defamation and
commercial speech); and fourth, it need not be beholden to so-called
democratic theories of majoritarian rule or the common good. Admittedly,
such a view of the First Amendment is an unabashed one, rooted more in
liberty than security and thus dependent on a liberal degree of toleration.
We the People need not take our conceptual cues from free speech
theorists who are more appropriately viewed as the modern-day descendants
of the Congregation of the Index. In these times when the liberal academy
and the illiberal think tank carry much influence, what the First Amendment
may need most is less theory and more liberty. While I do not argue for that
categorically, I am nonetheless willing to defend that idea as long as
reasonably possible, taking due account for a generous ration of risk.
Before leaving this subject, let me add a few more words, beginning
with these questions: Why theory? What purpose, if any, does it serve?
Might we have a First Amendment sans theory? In a rudimentary sense,
First Amendment theory might be said to serve two purposes: First, to help
rein in, “explain,” or criticize the in-and-outs of decisional law. And second,
theory shades the law in a blanket of norms, sometimes labeled “universal”
or “inalienable” or “fundamental” or “long-standing.”
As to the first purpose, part and parcel of legal analysis is the ability to
understand how the law is conceptualized and reconceptualized by those
who direct or interpret its course. Each generation of scholars has its builders
and levelers, its conceptualists and contextualists, its formalists and antiformalists, its Langdells and Llewellyns, and so on.104 And in the First
Amendment world, the law has been bound by the likes of William

103. See WALTER F. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 228 (1965)
(“The argument for freedom is a distinctly modern one . . . . [That is,] freedom was not the central
political principle that it was to become after the influence of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau . . . .
Instead of freedom, older writers considered virtue the organizing principle . . . ”). Thus
understood, the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights as a whole, marked a radical departure
from past precedent.
104. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT ix (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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Blackstone and unbound by the likes of Leonard Levy.
By design or
accident, the process of classification (like that of precedent) trades, at some
significant point, in a falsity. Lawyers do it, judges replicate it, and scholars
complicate it by way of their own conceptual templates. Absent some
normative telos, so the argument goes, the process is more mechanical than
philosophical, and in that sense might even be seen as game like, though an
important game to be sure. The main gloss that might be added here is that
concerning the demands of equality, of the law’s obligation to treat similarly
situated people similarly. That said, do we really need High Theory to check
the excesses of runaway judicial decision-making? If precedent is built on
some meaningful and constrained understanding of actual (as opposed to
fetishized theoretical) harm, then that should suffice for analytical purposes.
As to the second purpose, which can work in tandem with its
predecessor, theory hopes to explain or justify what we do or fail to do in the
course of human events, including those events concerning our system of
free expression. With Aristotelian allure, it points to a “higher good” (e.g.,
the acquisition of truth, self-realization, or personal autonomy) by which the
law of free expression should be measured and judged. Unitary theories are
created in the process of shrewdly linking facts to precedents and then
linking those precedents to some so-called “desired” norm. If there is a “fit”
(subjective as that determination is), then speech is protected, but if not,
theory abridges expression without any constitutional qualm. Seen in this
light, theory might be said to have a moderating influence on the law of free
speech; it cleanses the conceptual house while restraining human behavior
that might otherwise be deemed objectionable. Hence, theory is Pater-like;
it is the Father of the State telling us what we can say or not say (e.g., we
cannot publicly express visual sexuality, we cannot advertise condoms, or
we cannot speak ill of our government employers). In such a Pater world
the First Amendment is a bastard; it owes no allegiance to the ideal of
censorial paternalism. It does not deny norms or morals or truths; rather, it
demands no more than that private individuals decide such moderating
principles instead of having the State dictate them. This is the basic idea
behind the religion clauses and should likewise have some bearing on the
way we think about the expression clauses.
Free speech in a world without highbrow, overblown, and self-serving
normative theories linked to governmental regulation of expression need not
pave the way to a Borgia’s Rome. Again, those norms have their place in
the private sphere and in the governmental one too, provided only that speech

105. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 309–10 (1985) (historically
repudiating Blackstone).
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is not impermissibly abridged. Behind every High Theory of free speech
dwells the God of Piety, who in one way or another demands that many kinds
of speech be abridged in her honor. But the time has long passed for those
of us in the free speech community to continue to worship at such altars. In
our postmodern times, the role of the state in free speech matters is a humble
one, not a self-righteous one; it is to protect speech more than silence it. The
state is not a Pater or Goddess so much as a restrained policeman on duty to
safeguard the Commonwealth against real harms waged by real people
against other people.
Now, it will surely be said that all of this talk of harm is no more than
a norm masquerading as something it is not. And, so that argument would
go, to understand that norm one would need a theory of harm. Fair enough.
Still, I have ventured to address this issue in my earlier discussion of the
spectrum of harms.106 Conceptually speaking, what is crucial in this regard
is the need to harness any notion of harm lest it swallow up the very freedom
the First Amendment was designed to preserve. In that regard, what the
GUV crowd is most adept at, is fusing its values into alleged harms that
demand governmental intervention.

I want to step back for a moment and tease out a few, if you will, larger
but related philosophical and psychological points. Let me begin this way:
To be social, to be a part of civil society, a person must at some point
sublimate his or her expressive instincts. Otherwise we would find ourselves
in the throes of a Hobbesian melee. For the most part, that is part of the price
we pay for civilization. By that measure, expressive instinct is hobbled in
the name of political necessity. Still, if carried too far, such a move destroys
individuality by homogenizing it in the name of safety and civility. If
instinctual individuality is not to be destroyed, if it is not to be totally or
significantly sublimated, there must be some release valve, some social
mechanism that permits a dollop or more of the very thing that might (in the
long run) destroy it.
The First Amendment is that release valve.
Among other things, the early speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in
First Amendment jurisprudence spoke, in a way, to the general point I am

106. See supra text accompanying note 47. In a future work (tentatively titled In Harm’s Way),
I plan to say more, much more, about harm, how we speak and think of it, and its relation to the
First Amendment. For today, however, brevity demands that I put such thoughts on hold, if only
to provide my detractors with a measure of goading doubt.
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trying to make. On the one hand, certain kinds of conduct are too close to
the Hobbesian side of the destructive equation to be tolerated. Hence, they
are not constitutionally protected. It may well be symbolic expression to
heave a rock through the window of political foe, but such expression cannot
be sanctioned if the Republic is to endure. The takeaway point here is that
this kind of instinctual behavior wars with the survival and social premises
of any polity. On the other hand, certain kinds of speech are distant enough
from the specter of Hobbesian bedlam and mayhem as to be tolerated.
Hence, they are constitutionally protected. By that logic we may say the
vilest of things about our political opponents and, by and large, avoid the
punitive hand of the law. Here the takeaway point is that of the release valve,
the idea that some degree of instinctual expression is to be allowed, if only
as a concession to individual freedom.
In both a philosophical and psychological sense, the First Amendment
works to mediate the war between the self and society. Absent such kinds
of mediation, society would virtually crush almost all varieties of instinctual
expression it found to be adverse to any or all of its interests, however
broadly or vaguely defined. Of course, the instinctual self is never satisfied
and thus demands more expression and thus ever less sublimation. In some
respect, this may help to explain why we have witnessed the vast expansion
of free speech freedoms in modernity. Symbolic expression—i.e., flag
burning, cross burning, armband wearing, nude dancing—exemplifies how
even certain kinds of expressive conduct came to be constitutionally
protected, or at least partially so. Though over the dissent of the likes of
Justice Hugo Black,107 the march for yet more protection for expressive
behavior continues.
Insofar as modern American culture is concerned, in the past several
decades we have witnessed less individual sublimation and more societal
toleration. In the process, many believe we are today experiencing the
coarsening of our culture, insofar as the First Amendment has been rallied,
to protect everything from deviant forms of sexual expression108 to violent
forms of entertainment109 to hateful forms of expression.110 All triumphs
for almost instinctual expression, to be sure. But also, all defeats for
societal civility.
There is more: One reason why the Certainty Principle (or if you prefer,
the Truth Principle) is antithetical to First Amendment freedom is because
107. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 516–22 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
109. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
110. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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so much of the human psyche consists of a rich cross section of
contradictions—of beliefs pointing in different directions and of thought
being divergent from behavior. Such contradictions—in philosophic
stances, economic principles, religious beliefs, scientific premises, and
various interpretative canons—can be so significant as to be existential in
character. Because of that, we need a body of constitutive law that allows
for a measure of divergent thought and behavior at the micro and macro
levels. While precedent is said to be binding in law (though actually it is not
quite so), it has little place in the expressive affairs of men and women. Their
lives and their societal interactions often demand some real and messy
degree of illogical divergence from the normative edicts of the enlightened
or well-washed few. In other words, there has to be some breathing space
for instinctual expression, messy at that, it will always prove to be.
It is a very famous line in First Amendment jurisprudence, one that
warrants yet further examination: “[W]e consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.”111 Here, we can see in budding
form the case for instinctual expression—i.e., expression that is unrepressed
in character, vicious in tone, scathing in temper, and unrepressed in voicing
anger. This release of the uninhibited self onto the body politic is indicative
of the character of risks we as a society now take in the name of free speech
liberty. Most assuredly, it is not the kind of risk that the Congregation of the
Index would have ever tolerated. But, for better or worse, we have moved
on from those days, from that mindset, and from that notion of the relation
between the individual and her society. We have, in other words, embarked
on a grand experiment in both political philosophy and in psychological
wellbeing.

Mindful of what I have just said and more, the tension between the
Galileos and the Congregation of the Index of the worlds is inevitable. What
distinguishes the American experiment in freedom is that we have a
constitutional commitment to the old heretic and a corresponding skepticism
of ecclesiastical inquisitors and their modern-day counterparts. I do not say
that our commitment is either certain or absolute; but I do think it should be
aspirational to the greatest extent humanly possible.112

111.
112.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (emphasis added).
E.g., RONALD K.L. COLLINS, NUANCED ABSOLUTISM: FLOYD ABRAMS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 39–40, 70–72, 120–132 (2013).
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Notice that I do not stress any particular reason why I argue as I do; that
is, I do not offer the kind of norm that would be the crown jewel of some
High Theory of free speech. I may be wrong. Even so, there is something
splendid in being outside of that High Theory Crowd if such a stance points
to an appreciation of the First Amendment that is more renegade than
retrograde, more tolerant than intolerant, more creative than cabined, and
surely more risk prone than risk averse. Cast in romantic terms, America
sorely needs more George Anastaplos113 and Daniel Ellsbergs114 and
certainly more government whistleblowers.115 By and large, we have come
a long way in safeguarding the freedoms of such troublemakers. Then again,
the road is a long one and we as a nation still have many miles to go.
It is hard, to be sure, to altogether dismiss normative claims from the
conceptual table. And one could not do so for both pragmatic and (of course)
normative reasons, at least not without fear of being branded a depraved
nihilist. In this respect, my point is a modest one: If the First Amendment is
to have any operative meaning and strength, it must begin with some
meaningful consideration of real harms. Thereafter, if norms are what we
must have, then the steel of normative assertions must be strictly tested . . .
time and again. Otherwise wild-eyed claims to Truth and a host of other
Values will trump First Amendment freedoms time and again. This was as
true in the McCarthy era with its obsession with Communists as it is today
in the national security era with its preoccupation with government leakers.
Mere assertions tend towards the ought side of the conceptual equation,
while demonstrative proof tends towards the is side.
Necessity makes its demands. Thus, some accommodation will always
be needed. Such a constitutional accommodation is exemplified in the time,
place, and manner exception to the First Amendment. Accordingly, one
could not fairly claim a First Amendment right to erect a 100-foot
commercial neon sign in a residential area or have a raucous rock concert
near a neighborhood if the blare of Led Zeppelin-like electric guitars
continued on into the wee hours. This is reasonable enough, even by my
harm standards. But accommodation turns to misapplication when the
exception is tapped to silence unpopular expression. Case in point: In Feiner
113. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97–116 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); COLLINS &
CHALTAIN, supra note 98, at 4–16.
114. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); COLLINS & CHALTAIN,
supra note 98, at 59–87.
115. In this regard, the 5-4 ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos, evidences a cramped view of the
First Amendment—a view that all too cavalierly places the maintenance of employee timidity in
the workplace over the public disclosure of government wrongdoing. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Happily, and as noted earlier, the Garcetti rule was tamed a bit in favor of a modicum more of free
speech freedom in the case of Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 1533 (2014).
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v. New York, Justice Hugo Black was certainly warranted in taking
exception to the liberty Chief Justice Fred Vinson took in sustaining Irving
Feiner’s conviction for disorderly conduct. To quote Justice Black:
The record before us convinces me that petitioner, a young college
student, has been sentenced to the penitentiary for the unpopular views
he expressed on matters of public interest while lawfully making a
street-corner speech in Syracuse, New York. Today’s decision,
however, indicates that we must blind ourselves to this fact because
the trial judge fully accepted the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses on all important points. Many times in the past this Court
has said that despite findings below, we will examine the evidence for
ourselves to ascertain whether federally protected rights have been
denied; otherwise review here would fail of its purpose in
safeguarding constitutional guarantees. Even a partial abandonment
of this rule marks a dark day for civil liberties in our Nation.117

The maxim that time, place, and manner restrictions must be content
neutral118 and narrowly tailored represents a judicial attempt to rein in
abuses, though cases such as Feiner reveal that if the exception is too freely
applied abuses will surely occur. The Court’s opinion in Frisby v. Schultz119
is indicative of the need to monitor the invocation of even this rather
pragmatic exception.120 Here, again, the important point is to verify
claims121—pragmatic or normative—when invoked for some purported need

116. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
117. Id. at 321–322 (Black, J., dissenting).
118. See Kate Yannitte, Content-Neutral Time, Place, Manner Restrictions on Free Speech—
A Municipality’s Park Ordinance That Requires a Permit to Assemble More than Fifty People Is
Facially Constitutional, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 825, 830 (2002).
119. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (striking down on First Amendment grounds total
ban on displaying flags or banners on public sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court).
120. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public
forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”) (citations
omitted).
121. In this regard, the Court has been far too lenient in denying First Amendment claims in
cases where local authorities cavalierly invoke the “secondary effects doctrine.” See, e.g., City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding ban on total nudity in “dancing
establishment”). See David L. Hudson, Jr., Secondary-Effects Doctrine, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Sept.
13, 2002), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/secondary-effects-doctrine (“The secondaryeffects doctrine has proven to be fertile ground for abuse because it enables government officials
to conceal their thinly disguised dislike for adult entertainment behind claims of harmful effects.”).
The way the doctrine has been applied is a good example of morals regulations masquerading as
scientific fact.
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to abridge freedom of speech, press, petition, assembly, or the free exercise
of one’s faith. The more courts set out to verify, and to do so factually and
honestly, the more likely they are to see that the harm lawmakers feared was
the harm that we imagined.

For some fastidious types, much of what is set out herein will be seen
as unduly broad, coarse, and lacking in the kinds of analytical molding and
varnish that law professors delight in championing (if only in impenetrable
theory). In their eyes, such views may smack of the rank absolutism once
espoused by Justice Hugo Black.122 Likewise, my guess is that the brand of
presumptive liberty I have urged will be understood as imprudently oblivious
to the demands of context and the need for balancing (albeit endless
contextual balancing). Contextualists are not likely to endorse stringent First
Amendment protection of the brand vouchsafed in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,123 Brandenburg v. Ohio,124 Citizens United v. Federal Election
Comm’n,125 United States v. Stevens,126 and the like. For them, such
protection should not be seen as the normal or default position of freedom.
Although this position may represent the rhetorical high ground, for them it
also proves to be the analytical low ground. Seen in that skeptical light, the
First Amendment must be read narrowly. Thus, they claim: “In reality, the
First Amendment itself is an exception to the prevailing principle that speech
may be regulated in the normal course of government business.”127 This
claim reverses the presumption I have urged and replaces it, at least
operationally speaking, with a kind of due process, case-by-case form of

122. See HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH,
MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS 126–50 (1988); Justice Black and the First Amendment
“Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962). It is all too easy to dismiss Black’s
absolutism, which did have its analytical problems, as grossly simplistic. Of course, such an
assessment presumes his true jurisprudential intentions. In that regard, it is well to remember that
he was a “master tactician . . . who used his forensic and temperamental skills to great advantage.”
Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hugo Black Among Friends, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1885, 1893 (1995) (reviewing
Hugo Black: A Biography by Roger K. Newman). Whatever one may say of Black’s absolutism,
it did make Justice Brennan’s near absolutism relatively palpable. Viewed in that light, they may
well have had a “harmony of goals.” See William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks on the Occasion of the
Justice Hugo L. Black Centennial, in JUSTICE BLACK AND MODERN AMERICA 171, 181 (Tony
Freyer, ed., 1990) (quoting Justice Frankfurter).
123. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
124. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
125. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
126. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
127. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism in IF BUCKLEY FELL:
A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 103, 110 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz ed., 1999) (emphasis added).
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decision-making. One need not validate Justice Black’s absolutist creed in
order to discern that such an unbridled contextual approach to the First
Amendment would very much constrict the very degree of freedom to which
we as a people have become accustomed, if only grudgingly at times.
Though it is seldom, if ever, mentioned, certainty (or the insistence on
it) is what fuels much of the contextualist animus towards more so-called
libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment. Because we can never be
sure about the consequences of liberty, its domain must be restricted.
Otherwise, we subject ourselves to unforeseen risks. On that score, I repeat:
A high degree of risk is vital to freedom. Freedom is decreased proportionate
to the degree to which risk (often imagined) is diminished. Here the focus
is on the nexus between the demand for certainty and the avoidance of risk.
Since certainty can seldom, if ever, be determined, there will always be
consequential risks.
I contend that contrariety makes for a better First Amendment fit than
certainty. The ability to be torn, to hold opposing ideas at the same time, is,
I think, a necessary condition for forthright thinking. To reconsider,
reformulate, reinvent, and rearticulate one’s thought128 allows it to evolve
beyond the rigid constraints of certainty. True, contextualism can sometimes
help in that process. But it is all too often contextualism in the service of an
often futile form of certainty. Contextualists simply will not abide
uncertainty and the purported risks that accompany it. Hence, they champion
the fluidity of context in order to rein in free speech freedom. There are just
too many variables, they argue, to allow for much of anything approximating
a bright line rule or presumption in favor of liberty. Then again, even
contextualists would concede that there may be a degree of fortified
protection for particular kinds of expression (e.g., pure political speech) in
particular contexts (e.g., town hall meetings) provided, of course, due
allowance is made for time, place, and manner restrictions. While this
Norman Rockwell image is, to be sure, part of the heroic domain of the First
Amendment,129 standing alone it is too idealistic to do the real work of the
Madisonian guaranty. In the rough-and-tumble free speech world, such
idealism, as I have suggested above, works to diminish the domain of the
First Amendment.
128. See Phillip Sipiora, Editor’s Preface, in NORMAN MAILER, MIND OF AN OUTLAW:
SELECTED ESSAYS xvii (Phillip Sipiora ed., 2013) (stressing the value of continually adjusting
one’s beliefs); Ronald K.L. Collins, Mailer’s Resistance—A Little Lesson in Free Speech, 8 THE
MAILER REV. 92 (2014).
129. Some adherents of the Rockwell heroic standard take a dim view of less respectable
figures as candidates for heroic free speech designation. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Lives in the
Law: The Heroes of the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2118 (2003) (dismissing the idea of
Lenny Bruce, the ribald comedian, as a First Amendment hero).
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What, then, to do with the need for great precision and for due attention
to context? Here again, I think a presumption in favor of speech is key. That
presumption can be overcome by some showing of actual or imminent harm
of a significant nature. Beyond that, it is not the province of courts to
constrict free expression rights based on Platonic-like norms of behavior that
dictate our understanding of the First Amendment. Even so, some
contextualists might argue that cases such as Reno v. ACLU130 sweep too far
in safeguarding sexual expression or in giving the impression that such
speech might be protected when it fact it is not. They might likewise insist
on qualifying Justice Steven’s declaration that the “interest in encouraging
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship.”131 Good rhetoric, but bad law, they might
claim. Moreover, they might point to the excesses that have arisen post-Reno
insofar as patently obscene materials, in contravention of Miller v.
California’s132 standards, are the daily fare on the Internet.
Is there a problem here? I think not. For the First Amendment is more
than what judges say; it is also what people do133—that day-in and day-out
exercise of unabridged freedom not beholden to elevated notions of the
proper kinds of speech worthy of protection. Such expression needs no
HIGH VALUE justification to exist; its existence is its justification, at least
presumptively so. As the Internet obscenity illustration exemplifies, the
culture of the First Amendment may well exceed the law of the First
Amendment. And if it does (owing to what lawmakers and prosecutors
decline to do), then that is part of the domain of America’s modern liberty.
Remember: There are societal costs to such freedom134—the vulgarians and
their bunch have their tasteless ways. Admittedly, America is not as pristine
as it once was. Here again, that is the culture of the First Amendment—
vibrant though sometimes course, robust though sometimes upsetting, and
full-bodied though sometimes extreme.

Will the law of the First Amendment ever venture as far down the paths
as I have suggested? Not entirely—most people are too beholden to the playit-safe and play-it-by-my-norms mentality.135 Nonetheless, there are

130. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
131. Id. at 885.
132. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
133. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 199–215
(1992) (discussing cultural approach to the First Amendment).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
135. Again—and it cannot be repeated too often—the First Amendment represents a radical
break from that mindset.
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promising signs; we tend ever more in the direction of free speech
freedom.136 In the scheme of societal things, that movement may be
reversible in a slight way or more.137 After all, the future is a wild card. Still,
as a nation we have progressed so far down the path of free speech liberty
that I doubt that our momentous movement is stoppable. As far as I know,
never before in the history of humankind has such a wide swath of
communicative freedom existed, either constitutionally or culturally.
Meanwhile, holdover followers of the Congregation of the Index busily
rounded up gay pride protestors several years ago in Putin’s Russia, this as
they strove to again jail members of the punk rock group Pussy Riot for
dissing the Great Vladimir.138 On the morality side of the political equation,
in “modern” Saudi Arabia “The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and
the Prevention of Vice” (the official enforcer of Sharia) still keeps a watchful
eye on how women express themselves in public.139 True, it shocks us, as
well it should. And the reason it does is because such censorship is, literally
speaking, foreign to us as free Americans. Yes, we allow excesses; yes, we
permit a degree of abuse; yes, we permit a big dollop of sexual license in
movies; yes, we approve of citizens taking liberties with the reputations of
public servants; yes, we suffer hate speech; and yes, we take our chances
when we tolerate as much as we do in the name of free speech freedom. All
right, let us admit it. But it is just that American outlook that situates us on

136. Some seem to consider this disturbingly problematic. See Frederick Schauer, First
Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175,
194–196 (Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002) (stressing the purported necessity of the
“essence” of the First Amendment or its “antecedent” normative core in order to prevent its
“misapplication”). But cf. id. at 195–196 (noting that “in the final analysis none of the justifications
for a distinct free-speech principle is sound,” thus allowing for the possibility of “arguments for a
broader liberty”).
137. Consider, for example, the diminution of student free speech rights. See DAVID L.
HUDSON, JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE EXPRESSION
(Christopher Finan ed., 2011); GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP
AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE (2013).
138. See Zack Ford, Russian Police Arrest 60 Pride Protesters As Putin Signs Anti-Gay
Censorship Bill Into Law, THINK PROGRESS (July 1, 2013) http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013/07/
01/2238181/russian-police-arrest-60-pride-protesters-as-putin-signs-anti-gay-censorship-bill-intolaw/; Agence France Presse, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Pussy Riot Member, ‘Transferred To
Siberia’, HUFF. POST (Nov. 5, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/05/nadezhdatolokonnikova-siberia_n_4217448.html. See also David Herszenhorn, Released Punk Rockers
Keep Up Criticism of Putin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013) http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest
/2013/12/23/pussy_riot_release_punk_protesters_slam_amnesty_as_hoax_lie.html (“We didn’t
ask for any pardon,” Ms. Alyokhina said. “I would have sat here until the end of my sentence
because I don’t need mercy from Putin.”).
139. See Katherine Zoepf, Shopgirls: The Art of Selling Lingerie, NEW YORKER, Dec. 23 &
30, 2013 at 58, 60.
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a world stage radically different from Russia, Saudi Arabia, France,
Germany, and even England and Canada.
Though there is dissension (particularly in the legal academy), our
system of freedom of expression stands. Happily, demands to call a
constitutional convention or amend the First Amendment have gone
nowhere.140 But time can change minds. For example, one of my dear
friends and a renowned free speech scholar wrote a book titled What’s Wrong
with the First Amendment.141 Steve Shiffrin is his name, and I owe a great
deal of my formative education on the First Amendment to him. That said,
we do part company (for now, at least) at various intersections of free speech
jurisprudence. In his book, Professor Shiffrin contests much of today’s
speech protective wisdom when it comes to matters such as privacy,142 race
hate speech, commercial expression, campaign financing, and pretrial
proceedings, among others. If I dismissed this out of hand, I could only do
so by betraying all I cherish about the First Amendment. Shiffrin’s thoughts,
however provocative, deserve a full and fair hearing in the courtroom of our
minds.143 In that venue there can be no heretics, even when it comes to the
First Amendment. For all I know, Professor Shiffrin’s book may win over
minds; it may turn the tide away from much of today’s libertarian-like
thinking about the First Amendment. It may, in short, upset the very things
I hold dear in my current understanding of what free speech in America is or
should be about. Well, we take our chances—who knows, my old friend
may even persuade me . . . or, then again, he may further embolden my
current views. That, at any rate, is a chance one must take if one truly
believes in free speech. The lesson: Nothing is certain here. Take heed!

140. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE
MCCUTCHEON CASE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 189–92 (2014)
(discussing the call by Lawrence Lessig for a constitutional convention); Moveon.org (re
constitutional amendment).
141. Cambridge University Press published the book in 2016. See Ronald K.L. Collins, FAN
93 (First Amendment News) ‘What’s Wrong with the First Amendment?’—Steve Shiffrin Book
Coming This Summer, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 23, 2016), http://concurringopinions.com/
archives/2016/01/fan-93-first-amendment-news-whats-wrong-with-the-first-amendment-steve-shi
ffrin-book-coming-this-summer.html.
142. Of course, nothing that I say herein is intended to deny real harms caused by certain types
of invasion of privacy followed by public dissemination. See, e.g., Carrie Goldberg, It’s Clear:
Creating Amateur Porn Without a Participant’s Knowledge is Illegal in NY, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (July 16, 2014), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/07/carrie-goldbergits-clear-creating-amateur-porn-without-a-participants-knowledge-is-illegal-in-ny.html#more-89
052. See also DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
143. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, FAN 40 (First Amendment News) Steve Shiffrin & Bob
Corn-Revere debate “What’s Wrong with the First Amendment?” CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov.
12, 2014), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/11/fan-40-first-amendment-news-steveshiffrin-bob-corn-revere-debate-whats-wrong-with-the-first-amendment.html.
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To be a free people is to take risks. We cannot have genuine liberty if
we clutch to safety like children terrified of the dark. Free speech scholars
may frighten us with the sky-is-falling scenarios while contextualist
balancers echo that theme in opposition to reaffirmations of free speech
freedom. In that world censors tempt us with promises of security. But in
the end, it is too often a false promise. For little worth safeguarding is truly
gained if liberty is the altar on which such sacrifices are made. Brandeis had
it right: The First Amendment was made for a courageous people.144 And to
be courageous means taking risks, which in turn sometimes means forsaking
the security of collective certainty. Or as Galileo so well phrased it: “In
questions of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble
reasoning of a single individual.”145 Despite its romantic tenor, such an
insight might serve us well not only in matters of science, but also in matters
of life and law.

144.
145.

See supra text accompanying note 20.
GERARD PIEL, THE AGE OF SCIENCE: WHAT SCIENTISTS LEARNED IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 21 (2001) (quoting Galileo).
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